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Abstract
In this paper we experimentally investigate the consequences of electoral fraud on
voter turnout. The experiment is based on a strategic binary voting model where
voters decide whether to cast a costly vote in favour of their preferred candidate or to
abstain. The electoral process is illicitly influenced by applying ballot-box stuffing.
In the experiment we implement two different framings: we compare voter turnout in
a neutral environment and with framed instructions to explicitly replicate elections.
This approach enables us to both test the model’s predictions and to estimate
the framing effects of voting and fraud. Comparison of experimental results with
theoretical predictions reveals over-voting, which is exacerbated when fraud occurs.
Turnout increases as predicted with a moderate level of fraud while, with higher
levels of electoral fraud, voters fail to recognize that the existence of a relatively
larger number of “agents” voting with certainty considerably decreases the benefits
of voting. Importantly, framing matters, as revealed by the higher turnout of those
in the majority group, against which the fraud is applied.
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1 Introduction
Since the 1990s, with the last large wave of democratization of post-Soviet and eastern
European countries, the number of elections in the world has witnessed a sharp increase.
At the same time, the quality of elections has deteriorated over time: while the share
of elections reported to be illicitly influenced was around 15% of around 180 national
level elections during the period 1980-1990, it increased to almost 40% of around 480
elections in the period 2001-2010.1
In this paper we investigate, both theoretically and experimentally, the effects of electoral
fraud on voter turnout. Our objective is twofold. First, high turnout rate is often
quoted as an indirect indicator of properly organized and conducted elections. We thus
provide first evidence on whether a lower participation rate is effectively associated with
a higher degree of fraudulent intervention in the elections. Second, our experimental
design enables us to test whether the behavioural reaction to an electoral procedure
that is considered unfair also affects voter participation. Citizens may shy away from
voting when the election is characterized by a fraudulent mechanism or, alternatively,
they may be rather more likely to mobilize and go to the polls in order to counteract it.
Evidence of electoral fraud has been provided worldwide, both in developed and in
developing countries. Weak electoral identity-checking schemes were responsible for at
least 42 convictions for electoral fraud in the UK in the period 2000-2007 (Wilks-Heeg,
2008) and for promoting electoral fraud in Japanese municipal elections, as shown by the
natural experiment by Fukumoto and Horiuchi (2011). News reports, highlighting the
risk of voter fraud in several EU countries,2 have become a fairly routine part of electoral
campaigns. Douglas (2013) examines the multiplicity of election contest provisions and
the procedural mechanism used to manage them in US states: the notorious hanging
1Authors’ calculations based on data from Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA),
database on political institutions (DPI) and the Cingranelli-Richards human rights dataset (CIRI).
2EUobserver (2014): Threat of voter fraud haunts EU vote in Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia. See
http://euobserver.com/eu-elections/123485
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chads in 2000 in Florida is an example of the US not being immune to (potential)
electoral malpractices. While in developing countries electoral fraud is usually more
evident and takes a wider variety of forms, from vote buying to intimidation and explicit
violence, in the post-Soviet area the most common electoral malpractices are multiple
voting and ballot stuffing, according to the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (Bader, 2012).
In order to theoretically investigate the effects of fraud on voter turnout, we modify
the conventional binary election model with costly voting to allow for fraud, where
illicit intervention is promoted by only one out of two parties. Assuming that the
implementation of fraud is costly (hence limited) we show that, in equilibrium, fraud
might increase the turnout rate. In particular, a low level of fraud exerted in favour of
the competitor with the ex-ante less support should increase turnout in both groups,
whereas a higher fraudulent intervention should suppress voting motives and decrease
the turnout rates to a level lower than in equilibrium without fraud.
We test our predictions in a laboratory experiment, where we compare voting behaviour
in a baseline condition with respect to a situation where, respectively, a low and a high
level of fraud is introduced in the elections. The baseline condition is designed in a way
that allows direct comparisons with the paper by Levine and Palfrey (2007). In their
laboratory experiment, they test for the effect of changing the (relative and absolute) size
of the electorate of two competing groups of supporters on voter turnout: while a more
numerous electorate lowers turnout rate, having closer elections increases it. Finally,
they show that voters supporting the less popular alternative have higher turnout rates.
We thus provide an additional validity test for their results. However, in order to analyse
the effect of fraud on voting behaviour, we also introduce fraud in the elections. We
investigate voters’ reaction to an unfair electoral process in a framework involving a
decreasing (increasing) quality of elections, where voters experience an electoral system
which progressively evolves from a situation of electoral integrity (fraud) to electoral
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fraud (integrity).
We first investigate how individuals react to uneven ex-ante conditions when choosing
between two featureless options standing for voting and abstention. In the Neutral
treatment, the wording in the instructions is designed to induce a neutral environment;
there is no mention of voting, electoral fraud or voting costs. More specifically, in the
experiment, electoral fraud is introduced by adding a number of “fake” votes in favour
of the minority group.3
We then examine the importance of social and psychological factors in affecting voting
behaviour.4 In the Framing treatment the only modification is made with respect to the
terminology used in the instructions: we explicitly refer to elections and we render the
unfairness of the uneven condition more salient, by explicitly referring to “vote rigging”.
The experiment provides a number of noteworthy results. First, the comparison of
experimental results with theoretical predictions reveals over-voting (analogous results
were obtained by Levine and Palfrey (2007)). Second, as expected, limited fraudulent
intervention increases the turnout and this result is observed both in the Neutral and
Framing treatment. Third, extensive fraud has a significant negative impact on turnout
rates, as suggested by the theoretical model, merely in the Neutral treatment, but still
turnout is higher than when electoral integrity is fully assured. Fourth, in the Framing
treatment, the majority group, against which the fraud is undertaken, responds with
significantly higher participation in the extensive ballot box stuffing case. However this
evidence is not always confirmed when limiting the analysis to a setting characterized by
a decreasing, rather than an increasing, quality of electoral integrity. This suggests that
3In particular, we decided to make the extent of fraud clear to the participants since we aim to provide
first evidence of voters’ behaviour in a clear and clean environment. As in most experimental studies,
our study abstracts away from many elements of real life in order to cleanly identify specific effects and
motivations. However, in the conclusion we highlight interesting future research questions. Our game
can be easily modified to include, for example, the effects of the perception of fraud on turnout or a
player whose role is to decide whether to rig the elections or not.
4The study of political processes has only recently started to incorporate behavioral economics in-
sights. van Winden (2015), for example, investigates the role of emotions and relationships in political
economics. For a survey see Schnellenbach and Schubert (2015).
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the timing of (extensive) electoral fraud might play a role in affecting voters’ behaviour.
The observed differences between the Framing and Neutral treatments suggest that
voting behaviour cannot be solely explained by the (in)ability of agents to correctly
infer their expected pay-offs when deciding to vote or to abstain. In this paper we
provide evidence of behavioural aspects that cannot be disregarded when considering
voting in a fraudulent environment.
2 Related literature
In spite of its frequent occurrence, fraud has rarely been studied within the theoret-
ical literature on voting. Previous works mainly analyse how different type of electoral
malpractices, such as vote buying and electoral violence, affect elections (Collier and Vi-
cente, 2012, Ellman and Wantchekon, 2000). The closest study to our own is provided
by Vorobyev (2016), who investigates the mechanism of making participation decisions
in the presence of electoral fraud. In his theoretical model electoral fraud is designed as
ballot rigging, so that when a voter abstains, their unused ballot may be transformed
into a vote for the incumbent with known probability. According to the analysis of
Vorobyev (2016), two equilibria exist: abstention, where none of the voters vote and the
incumbent always wins, and coordination, where some challenger’s supporters vote and
the candidate preferred by the majority is likely to win. With respect to this paper,
there are a number of differences in the way we set up both the model and the fraud
technology, as shown in section 3. In particular, we do not model electoral fraud as
stolen votes, but rather consider the number of fake ballots introduced independently
from the number of abstaining voters. An important outcome difference is that in our
model the probability of the incumbent winning the election monotonously increases
with the number of fake ballots. Most importantly, we test our predictions by means
of an experiment and provide evidence that voter turnout may increase, rather than
decrease, as a consequence of electoral fraud.
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In the empirical literature, electoral fraud has been shown to substantially impact the
outcome of the polls (Enikolopov et al., 2013), increasing the probability of the incum-
bent to win the elections (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2009). Drawing on aggregate-level data
from different countries, it has been found that electoral fraud decreases participation
by either making the outcome less predictable and thus representing an additional cost
to voters (Vergne, 2009), or by decreasing the perception of electoral integrity and cit-
izens’ trust in elections, finally reducing their propensity to vote (Birch, 2010, Carreras
and I˙repog˘lu Yasemin, 2013, McCann and Dominguez, 1998). Conversely, by using data
from a voters’ representative survey, Bratton (2008) shows that vote buying has no stat-
istically significant impact on voter turnout, while the threat of violence has a negative
effect on it.
However, electoral fraud is inherently difficult to observe and measure, so that it is diffi-
cult to study the relationship between electoral fraud and turnout using empirical data.
Moreover, the impact of electoral integrity on voter turnout may not be straightforward,
since different types of electoral malpractices (threat of violence, coercion, vote buying,
etc.) and magnitudes of electoral fraud may lead to different and contrary effects, as well
as both complex micro and macro conditions which have to be controlled for in empirical
studies (Norris, 2014). These studies are often based on the perception of fairness of
elections, an opinion that also depends on people’s candidate preference and campaign
competitiveness (Wolak, 2014). Our laboratory experiment allows to investigate the
effects of electoral fraud in a controlled environment where ceteris paribus analysis is
possible, thus overcoming the limitations of previous empirical studies.
The consequences of fraud on voters’ participation is unclear also from a behavioural
point of view. In the electoral context, the procedure by which the candidate is elected
is of extreme importance. In particular, in the social psychology literature, Deutsch
(1975) states that ”people are more apt to accept decisions and their consequences if
they have participated in making them” (p.139): when the electoral process is unfair, in
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the sense that it allows fraudulent interventions to limit people’s participation, voters
may be more likely to cast a vote for their preferred, but unfairly sabotaged, candidate
with respect to a situation when there is no fraud at all. In order to define an election as
fair, procedural characteristics are fundamental, as shown by the experiment by Wilk-
ing (2011): participants were asked to judge a series of hypothetical scenarios and their
opinion about fairness in the elections was largely independent of whether they resided
in a democracy or non-democracy, or whether they were politically engaged. Previous
research on the effect of procedural injustice in Economics has shown that people are
prone to impose a cost, both on themselves and others, to resist procedures that they
value as biased (Bolton et al., 2005). Individuals’ intrinsic sense of (procedural) fairness,
activated by framing the experiment as an election characterized by a fraudulent voting
mechanism, will thus act as a motivating force in individual choice behaviour. Whenever
procedural injustice affects emotions such as anger, we expect that it can in turn affect
turnout (Tarrow, 1998). People may be willing to bear a higher cost of voting in order
to take revenge when being treated unfairly in an election. In line with this reasoning,
in their recent laboratory experiment, Aimone et al. (2017) show that voters are willing
to engage in voting as a form of punishment against candidates who broke their electoral
promises, even if they are indifferent with respect to the electoral outcome. However,
it is also possible that voters, when facing electoral fraud, may be rather less likely to
cast a vote for their preferred party, shying away from the unfairness of the electoral
procedure. Our study allows to examine whether and how voters react to the procedural
unfairness of elections, when the fraudulent intervention is made common knowledge.
In this paper we provide first experimental evidence of the effects of electoral fraud on
voter turnout in a very simple framework. In the experiment we intentionally analyse
voters’ behaviour in an environment where the level of fraud is known, certain and exo-
genously imposed. This was done in order to allow us to investigate the relationships
hypothesised in the theoretical model, while abstracting from other factors which may
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also be at work in the broader social setting namely, for example, the ambiguity of
electoral fraud and the relevance of the candidate’s intentions when applying ballot box
stuffing. We thus acknowledge that future research is needed to shed light on the role
of these aspects in influencing turnout in a system characterized by electoral fraud.
In the experiment we compare a Neutral Treatment with a Framing one, where the
election environment is explicitly stated and the fraudulent intervention in the electoral
process is made common knowledge. Given the complexity of the real world, especially
in the political context, we aim to analyse whether framing the experiment as a fraudu-
lent election makes people react differently with respect to an identical situation, where
actions and payoffs are expressed in neutral terms.
The role of differently framing the elections on voter turnout has rarely been systemat-
ically tested. Previous researchers have studied how media frames affect voter turnout
and vote choice (Butler and Marchal, 2007, Schuck et al., 2013, 2014, Valentino et al.,
2001), underlying the role of both transparency about the redistributive consequences of
individual’ votes (Paetzel et al., 2017) and source credibility (Druckman, 2001) in mak-
ing framing successful. Our paper extends this literature by testing for the existence
and consequences of the framing effect of ballot rigging on voting behaviour within a
laboratory experiment. As suggested by Druckman (2004), investigating in which con-
texts framing effects occur allows for a deeper understanding of the applications of the
rationality assumptions.
Previous researchers have investigated voter turnout in the laboratory, under many dif-
ferent institutions: Schram and Sonnemans (1996), Grosser et al. (2005), Grosser and
Schram (2010) focus on participation games and coordination problems such as the
volunteer’s dilemma while Houser et al. (2011) and Houser and Stratmann (2008) in-
vestigate the effects of campaign advertising on voting.5 One of the most influential
experimental papers on voter turnout is provided by Levine and Palfrey (2007), who
5Palfrey (2009)) provides a survey of experimental studies of voting behaviour.
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investigate voter turnout by addressing comparative statics questions about the effect
of the electorate size, relative party size, and voting cost on subjects’ decision to vote.
Their results support their theoretical predictions with the exception that turnout prob-
abilities are higher than those predicted when considering larger electorates (i.e. with 27
and 51 voters). The design of our experiment allows us not only to compare our results
with those obtained by Levine and Palfrey (2007) but, more importantly, to investigate
the effect of introducing fraud into the electoral system on the voting behaviour of the
electorate.
3 The model
We define electoral fraud as “the corruption of the process by which votes are cast and
counted”, as suggested by Minnite and Callahan (2003) and, similarly, by Lehoucq
(2002). In the present study we apply ballot-box stuffing type of fraud. However, it
is worth emphasising that qualitatively similar theoretical results are obtained when
asymmetries in costs are introduced between the supporters of the two groups.
In our model we include electoral fraud in the framework developed by Levine and
Palfrey (2007). There are N voters who can choose to vote or to abstain. They support
one of the two candidates: the Incumbent (I) or the Challenger (C) with NI < NC , so
that supporters of the Incumbent are in the minority. The sizes of the two groups are
common knowledge. Voting is assumed to be costly and every voter i knows their own
cost ci. They also know the single-peaked distribution function f(c) from which the
voting costs of the other voters are independently drawn. The candidate who receives
more votes wins the elections and ties are broken by a fair coin toss. If candidate I
wins, all voters supporting him receive a reward H and all voters supporting candidate
C receive a reward L, with L < H, while the opposite happens when candidate C wins.
The size of the rewards is common knowledge.
The Incumbent can interfere with the elections by introducing fake ballots. The strategy
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of the Incumbent is defined as the (integer) number δ ∈ [0,∆] of fake ballots which are
placed in the polling box. The electoral fraud applied by the Incumbent is supposed to
be costly. Interventions must increase their probability of winning the election, given
the electoral rule in force. Let Φ(δ) be the convex cost function of the fraud. Also, let
n∗I be the expected number of the Incumbent’s supporters who vote in equilibrium and
n∗C be the expected number of the Challenger’s supporters who vote in equilibrium.
We define the expected plurality EP as the difference between the expected number of
votes in favour of the Incumbent and in favour of the Challenger - EP (δ) = δ+nI(δ)−
nC(δ). The falsifier’s problem would be
6:
max
δ
−(EP (δ)−M)2 (1)
s.t.Φ(δ) ≤ B (2)
where M is the difference in votes that the Incumbent wants to achieve in equilibrium.
Thus, M = 1 describes a situation where the Incumbent is only interested in winning
the elections, whereasM > 1 corresponds to a situation where a larger expected margin
of victory is required. Though theory suggests that in a binary election a candidate must
only be interested in getting more votes than the opponent, there is widespread evidence
that Incumbents apply wider manipulations to win elections with a larger margin. Bene-
fits of excessive fraud during the elections can be of various types, such as discouraging
opponents from joining or supporting rival parties, from voting, or from participating in
the competition in other ways or, alternatively, it may motivate supporters to particip-
ate more actively (Simpser, 2013). B is the exogenously given budget of the falsifying
Incumbent.
6An alternative formulation where the win probability is directly incorporated into the Incumbent‘s
preferences would be the following: max
δ
R · prob[n∗I(δ) = n∗C(δ) +M] − Φ(δ), where R is the benefit
associated with winning and Φ(δ) is the cost function of the fraud.
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Players move simultaneously in the above described game. While in turnout models
simultaneity is considered a natural modelling approach for voters, the actions of the
Incumbent require additional clarification. An alternative view would be to assume that
the Incumbent can actually monitor the process of the election (e.g. by applying exit
polls) or even falsify the electoral results after the vote count. Differently, we assume
simultaneity of choices believing that the fraudulent interventions on behalf of the In-
cumbent need to be planned and designed in advance and thus cannot be considered a
“last minute” response to negative developments on the election day.
In the following, we look for group symmetric equilibria of the voting game, which are
known to be in cut-point strategies. A cut-point strategy for voter i specifies a cost level
c∗i such that voter i abstains if and only if ci > c
∗
i . This implies an aggregating voting
probability for each group, (p∗C , p
∗
I) given by:
p∗C =
∫ c∗C
−∞
f(c)dc = F (c∗C) (3)
p∗I =
∫ c∗I
−∞
f(c)dc = F (c∗I) (4)
Given that in equilibrium every voter in the group follows the same rule, this means
that a voter with a voting cost exactly equal to c∗ must be indifferent between voting
and abstaining. It is easy to demonstrate that these indifference conditions are given by
the following equations:
c∗I =
H − L
2
(prob[niI + δ + 1 = nC ] + prob[n
i
I + δ = nC ]) (5)
c∗C =
H − L
2
(prob[njC + 1 = nI + δ] + prob[n
j
C = nI + δ]) (6)
Superscript ‘i’ (‘j’) indicates that the number of those who voted for the Incumbent
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(Challenger) is nI (nC) excluding voter ‘i’ (‘j’).
Given the preferences of the falsifier, the equilibrium of the game is characterised by the
following conditions:
c∗I =
H − L
2
pi∗I (p
∗
I , p
∗
C , δ
∗, NI , NC) (7)
c∗C =
H − L
2
pi∗C(p
∗
I , p
∗
C , δ
∗, NI , NC) (8)
arg max
δ
−(δ∗ + p∗I(δ)NI − p∗C(δ∗)NC −M)2 (9)
Φ(δ∗) ≤ B (10)
where piI and piC are the pivot probabilities and have the following representation:
pi∗I =
NI−1∑
k=0
(
NI − 1
k
)(
NC
k + δ
)
(F (c∗I))
k(1− F (c∗I))NI−1−k
× (F (c∗C))k+δ(1− F (c∗C))NC−k−δ +
NI−1∑
k=0
(
NI − 1
k
)(
NC
k + δ + 1
)
(F (c∗I))
k×
(1− F (c∗I))NI−1−k(F (c∗C))k+δ+1(1− F (c∗C))NC−k−1−δ (11)
pi∗C =
NI∑
k=0
(
NI
k
)(
NC − 1
k + δ
)
(F (c∗I))
k(1− F (c∗I))NI−k×
(F (c∗C))
k+δ(1− F (c∗C))NC−k−δ−1 +
NI∑
k=0
(
NI
k
)(
NC − 1
k + δ − 1
)
×
(F (c∗I))
k(1− F (c∗I))NI−k(F (c∗C))k+δ−1(1− F (c∗C))NC−k−δ (12)
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We do not make any explicit assumptions about the cost function Φ(δ) and we are not
going to solve the Incumbent’s problem explicitly. As it will be made clear below, in
the current framework fraud monotonically increases the expected plurality (or winning
probability) in favour of the Incumbent, hence limited fraud can be rationalized only by
assuming that the falsifier is cost constrained. Since we are interested in the reaction of
the electorate to different levels of electoral fraud, we assume that the parameters of the
Incumbent’s objective function and budget constraint are such that he can introduce a
sufficient level of fraud in the election to win it (in expectation). When deriving the
equilibrium of the voting game, we will thus focus only on the strategies of the voters,
who are acting simultaneously. In the general case, the exogenously given absolute
margin of victoryM derives the equilibrium of the game, which determines the optimal
fraud level endogenously.
3.1 Predictions
Numerical estimation techniques are applied to obtain the exact predictions for the
turnout rate in the game. Given that we do not have a falsifier as a subject in the lab,
we fix the fraud level exogenously.
We assume that voting costs are sufficiently high for some voters, so that abstention is
their dominant strategy (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1985), and equal to zero with positive
probability for other voters, so that for them voting will be a weakly dominant strategy,
irrespective of the number of fake ballots introduced. This, along with the assumption
of a single-peaked cost distribution, ensures a unique group-symmetric equilibrium in
our setup.
Table 1 presents the results of our numerical estimations of the equilibria. In Figure 1,
in order to verify the robustness of our predictions, we provide a graphical view of our
numerical estimations for different electorate sizes, while keeping the Incumbent’s relat-
ive support constant (Left Panel), as well as for a range of support for the Incumbent,
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keeping the total number of voters fixed (Right Panel).
Incumbent group size 9 (fraud in favour of Incumbent)
Challenger group size 18
Number of fake ballots
0 1 2 3 4 5
Group turnout probability (Incumbent) 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.25 0.11
Group turnout probability (challenger) 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.19
Expected Turnout (Incumbent group) 2.43 2.61 2.71 2.66 2.27 0.97
Expected Turnout (challenger group) 4.10 4.77 5.25 5.43 5.08 3.38
Expected Total turnout 6.53 7.38 7.96 8.09 7.35 4.35
Expected Plurality -1.67 -1.15 -0.53 0.23 1.20 2.59
Pivot Probability 0.40 0.44 0.47 0.47 0.43 0.26
Probability of Incumbent winning 0.23 0.32 0.42 0.54 0.70 0.91
Total turnout rate 0.24 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.27 0.16
Table 1: Theoretical predictions.
Figure 1: Results of our numerical estimations
As suggested by the results of our numerical estimations, electoral fraud increases
turnout rate when it is limited and decreases it when the level of fraud is high. Dif-
ferently to Vorobyev (2016), where the participation of the Incumbent’s supporters de-
creases with higher probability of ballot rigging, our model predicts that a low level
of electoral fraud positively affects participation of both the majority and the minority
party. The intuition behind such a difference depends on the electoral fraud’s techno-
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logy: while in Vorobyev (2016) it is modelled as the probability that the abstainers’
vote will be stolen, in our framework it is designed as the number of fake ballots added
to the pool, so that the probability of tied elections increases with a low level of fraud.
In its turn, the higher the probability of a tied election, the lower the incentive to free
ride in the larger group and the higher the incentive to vote for the minority, since they
have higher a chance of casting a pivotal vote. This statement can easily be verified
by looking at the change in pivot probabilities. Strategic motives to vote diminish at a
high rate once the fraud goes beyond the level that guarantees the expected victory in
binary elections.
3.2 Testable hypothesis
Based on the predictions of the theoretical model we formulated the following hypo-
theses:
Hypothesis 1. In the Baseline condition a higher turnout is observed for the under-
dog candidate, as a manifestation of the classic free-riding problem in the larger group.
Hypothesis 2. The relationship between the extent of the fraudulent intervention
and the turnout rate has an inverted U-shaped pattern. Limited fraud increases turnout
while higher levels of fraud decrease it beyond the level observed in the Baseline condi-
tion without fraud.
Hypothesis 2a. The turnout patterns described in Hypothesis 2 are observed both
in the minority and majority groups.
In addition to these two purely strategic hypotheses derived from the model, we have
an additional behavioural hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 3. Framing the experiment as an election with vote rigging increases
voter turnout with respect to a neutral environment, because of the the majority’s re-
action to procedural injustice.
Deviations from equilibrium in the Framing treatment can be attributed to three main
motives. The framing treatment might i) induce individuals to hold mistaken beliefs
about their probability of being pivotal, ii) make them choose a strategy which is incon-
sistent with their beliefs, namely a reaction to procedural unjustice or, finally, it might
iii) create an experimenter demand effect, when individuals do not want to appear to
be passively accepting vote rigging in the eyes of the experimenter.7
With respect to point i) and ii), Duffy and Tavits (2008) experimentally investigate
whether there is a direct correlation between the strength of an individual’s belief to be
pivotal and their likelihood to vote. In their abstract experiment, they provide evid-
ence that participants are more likely to turnout if they believe their vote to be pivotal,
and that they systematically overestimate this probability. Their results suggest that
holding mistaken beliefs about their own pivotality might be a possible explanation for
individuals’ deviations from equilibrium, rather than individuals’ failure to best respond
to those beliefs. In our experimental setting we did not include a belief elicitation phase
so these two effects cannot be clearly disentangled. However, if beliefs about others’
voting behaviour are influenced differently in the Neutral vs. Framing treatment, we
should expect this phenomenon to affect our results both with low and high levels of
fraud, meaning that differences in voter turnout between the Neutral and Framing treat-
ment should be observed independently of the strength of the ballot box stuffing. We
can thus provide indirect evidence to test for this effect by analysing the experimental
data.
7We thank an anonymous referee for providing us with the intuition on the experimenter demand
effect and on the possible role of beliefs.
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With respect to point iii), even if we cannot a priori exclude that the experimenter
demand effect plays a role in explaining our results, previous evidence in the literature
about bribing and dishonesty provides interesting insights into this concern. In our
experiment, individuals in the Framing treatment might not want to be a voter who
passively accepts vote rigging. Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006) explicitly tested the
role of loaded versus neutral instructions in a bribery experiment, a context where par-
ticipants might not want to appear to the experimenter as those who accept bribery.
The authors found that even if the framing treatment had a lower bribery rate and
bribery acceptance rate, the difference was too small to be statistically significant. In
Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi (2013), the authors experimentally test the emergence of
dishonesty by means of the die under the cup paradigm. They found no effect of increas-
ing anonymity on the lying pattern of individuals, suggesting that reputational concern
with respect to the experimenter in the moral sphere might not be a big concern.
Nevertheless, we acknowledge that further research is needed to clearly and cleanly
disentangle the above described forces, for example by increasing the social distance
between the experimenter and the subjects (i.e. increasing anonymity) in order to in-
vestigate the experimenter demand effect, this would however, as a drawback, reduce
control.
4 Experimental design
Our experiment mirrors the game discussed in the theoretical model, with few differ-
ences.
In the Baseline condition, at the beginning of each period, each participant is informed
whether he was randomly assigned to group ALPHA or to group BETA8 Group A is
composed of 9 participants while group B is composed of 18 participants. The two sizes
8In the following we refer to group A for group ALPHA and to group B for Group BETA. Random
reassignment of subjects to groups A or B was intended to minimize repeated-game effects.
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were common knowledge to all participants.9 Individuals are asked in each round to
choose X or Y. The voting cost is referred to as a Y bonus and is added to a parti-
cipant’s earnings if that participant chooses option Y instead of choosing option X in a
round. Therefore, the voting cost is implemented as an opportunity cost. Bonuses are
randomly redrawn in every round, independently for each subject, and subjects are told
their own Y bonus before making any decision. We thus assume incomplete information
about voters’ heterogeneous voting costs. If a participant chooses X, that participant
does not receive their Y bonus for that round.
Payoffs in each round are determined as follows: if more members of A(B) choose X
than members of B(A), then each member of A(B) receives 105 and each member of
group B(A) receives 5. In the case of a tie, each member of each group receives 55.
In order to test the effect of electoral fraud on individuals’ voting behaviour, we imple-
ment the Fraud I and Fraud II conditions. In Fraud I and Fraud II everything is the
same as in the Baseline condition, with the only exception being that now respectively
2 and 5 fake ballots are automatically added to the minority group.
In each experimental session, participants play the the Baseline game for 50 rounds,
while both Fraud I and Fraud II games are repeated for 25 rounds.
In our main treatment, the Neutral treatment, in the instructions we never refer to
elections or voting or ballot rigging, labels are abstract.10
Differently than in our theoretical model, in the experiment we decided not to include a
subject playing the role of the Incumbent choosing the optimal level of fraud for three
main reasons. First, in the theoretical model, the Incumbent and their preferences are
important to understand why the fraud can be limited in size, so that its existence has
no impact on our predictions on voter turnout. Second, including such a role in the
experiment would have unnecessarily complicated our design, adding an additional level
9We decided to choose these group sizes for the A and B groups in order to compare experimental
data with clear-cut theoretical predictions about voting behaviour. When theoretical predictions are
not matched, it is less probable that this will happen in a more favourable situation.
10For the English version of the instructions (originally in Italian) see the on-line Appendix A.
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of procedural unfairness. If anything, the presence of an Incumbent would strengthen
our results. Third, since to the best of our knowledge we are the first to examine the
effect of fraudulent elections on voter turnout in a clean and simple way, an Incumbent
would have made our analysis closer to the real world but would have also made our
results on turnout more difficult to interpret: its inclusion would have brought about
new questions such as the Incumbent’s expectations of voter behaviour and vice-versa,
and distributional considerations of the Incumbents’ and their supporters’ payoffs. We
thus decided to leave this dimension to further research.
4.1 Experimental Procedures
The experiment was programmed using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). We conducted 6 ses-
sions of the Neutral Treatment at the EELAB experimental laboratory of the University
of Milano-Bicocca, involving 162 participants in total.
Since we think that the natural field setting in which our results would be most ap-
plicable are the ones more likely to involve a decreasing quality of elections, with an
electoral system which progressively evolves through a situation of electoral fraud, 4
Order sessions, characterized by a decreasing quality of elections (Baseline - Fraud I -
Fraud II), were run from October 2014 to January 2015. To check for the robustness
of our results, we also investigated the effect of electoral fraud on voter turnout when
considering elections characterized by an increasing integrity: 2 Reverse Order sessions
were run in December 2015, so that participants played the Fraud II condition first,
then the Fraud I and, finally, the Baseline condition.
Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate population of the University of Milano-
Bicocca, via ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004). No subject participated in more than
one session of this experiment.
Once in the laboratory, each participant was randomly assigned to one visually isolated
computer terminal. The instructions for the first part were then read aloud and par-
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ticipants could read them on their screen. Individuals were asked to answer a set of
control questions on the screen.
Instructions about each of the following parts were made to appear on the subjects’
screen and read aloud only after the completion of the previous instructions.
A test for risk aversion (Holt and Laury, 2002) was implemented as the last task.
At the end of each session, the pay-off of all rounds was added up and the sum was
converted into Euros. Before proceeding with payment to the subjects, we asked parti-
cipants to fill out a demographic form in order to collect information about their age and
gender. The duration of each session was about 60 minutes and the average payment
was 14 Euros.
5 Results
We study the impact of fraudulent electoral intervention by taking into account the fact
that participants’ choices may be dependent upon previous periods in the same session.
In particular, when comparing voting behaviour between and within treatments we
report the results, respectively, from a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney),
by averaging the data within a session and treating each session as a single observation,
and from a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, by pairing the observed frequency of voting of
the majority and minority group in each session.11
5.1 Neutral Treatment
In the following we report the results of the Order sessions, of the Reverse Order ones and
of a combination of both of them.12 A more detailed and precise analysis is conducted
thereafter, where a series of regression models are used to analyse turnout behaviour at
11In the following we refer to MW for the Mann-Whitney test and to WSR for the Wilcoxon signed-
rank test.
12Since the Reverse Order sessions were implemented as a robustness check, it is important to note
that the lower number of (independent) observations with respect to the Order sessions calls for a very
large effect size to reach an acceptable statistical power.
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the individual level.
We initially consider the Baseline condition without any fraud intervention: we compare
the observed results with our theoretical predictions and with those obtained in previous
studies. We then assess the impact of the fraudulent intervention on turnout, in order
to estimate to what extent voters are behaving strategically.
We start our analysis by considering voter turnout in the Baseline condition. Table 2
shows the aggregate turnout rates for the Baseline condition and compares them with
our theoretical equilibria.
Experimental Results Neutral Theoretical
Treatment Equilibrium
Majority
Order
0.323
0.228
(0.018)
Reverse Order
0.308
(0.007)
Both
0.318
(0.012)
Minority
Order
0.367
0.270
(0.025)
Reverse Order
0.319
(0.026)
Both
0.351
(0.020)
Table 2: Turnout rates under the Baseline condition in the Neutral treatment (Standard
error in parentheses).
According to our theoretical model, we should observe voter turnout to be equal to
0.228 and 0.270, in the majority and minority group, respectively. Participants in the
experiment voted with a significantly higher frequency than theoretically hypothesised,
independently of the order of the sessions (one-sample WSR: p<0.10). Considerable
over-voting was also observed in Levine and Palfrey (2007), when considering treat-
ments with large electorates (i.e. 27 and 51). One of the central results consistently
predicted in strategic costly voting games is that higher turnout is expected among the
underdog candidate’s supporters. This is due to the manifestation of the classic free
riding incentives in the larger group, which in turn makes voting for the representatives
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of the smaller group more rewarding.
A Wilcoxon signed-rank (WSR) provides evidence that the overall average turnout rate
(50 rounds) is significantly higher for the minority group than for the majority group
(Order sessions: p=0.072, one-sided).13 The same results hold when analysing both the
Order and Reverse Order sessions together (p=0.06, one-sided), but fails to reach signi-
ficance in the Reverse Order sessions. Result 1 states our main findings in the Baseline
condition, at the aggregate level.
Result 1. In the Neutral treatment without electoral fraud, the turnout rate is higher
in the minority group than in the majority group, providing evidence that Hypothesis 1
cannot be rejected.
In the following, we analyse voters’ response to electoral fraud, which is the main ob-
jective of our study. According to our theoretical predictions, both for the majority and
minority groups, voting should increase when 2 fake ballots are introduced (Fraud I)
while it should fall to a lower level than the Baseline condition when 5 fake ballots are
added to the minority group (Fraud II).
Figure 2 graphs the voter turnout rate observed in the Baseline, Fraud I and Fraud II
conditions in the Neutral treatment.
We first investigate whether the differences in turnout between the Baseline and Fraud I
voting conditions are statistically significant. Our tests provide evidence that a low level
of fraud significantly increases turnout in the Neutral treatment (WSR, Order sessions:
p=0.068 ). The same results hold when analysing both the Order and Reverse Order
sessions together (WSR, p=0.028 ), but fails to reach significance in the Reverse Order
sessions (WSR: p=0.180 ).
13All statistical tests reported are two samples and two-sided unless differently specified. When we
have clear, explicit and theory-driven predictions about voters‘ behaviour in the different treatments we
used one-sided tests.
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Figure 2: Voter turnout across periods in the Baseline, Fraud I and Fraud II parts in
the Neutral treatment.
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More specifically, our findings reject the null hypothesis when using data from all rounds
when considering the majority group (Order sessions:p=0.068 ) but not the minority
group (Order sessions:p=0.143 ).14
Our second result summarizes our findings.
Result 2. With respect to the Baseline condition, in the Neutral treatment, total voter
turnout significantly increases in Fraud I.
Result 3 states our main finding with respect to the introduction of a high level of
ballot box stuffing in the elections, in Fraud II.
14When considering all sessions together, we observe that turnout significantly increases from Baseline
to Fraud I for both the minority and majority group (WSR, Order & Reverse order sessions, majority:
p=0.028 ; minority: p=0.046 ).
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Result 3. In the Neutral treatment, voter turnout in Fraud II is significantly lower
than in Fraud I, only when considering an electoral system characterized by a decreasing
quality of elections. Moreover, participation in the elections is still higher than in the
Baseline.
Our results are only partially consistent with our Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 2a.
While when increasing the fraudulent intervention in favour of the minority group to
five ballots the total voter turnout in the Neutral treatment is lower than when two fake
ballots are added (WSR test, Order sessions: p=0.068), we still observe that participants
overvote with respect to our theoretical predictions: participation in the elections is still
higher than in the Baseline. Moreover, the same result does not hold if we also include
the Reverse Order sessions in the analysis, since voter turnout corresponds to 41.07 in
Fraud I and to 42.44 in Fraud II, showing that this evidence is not robust when re-
versing the order of the games. More specifically, while in the Baseline condition there
are no differences among the Order and Reverse Order sessions, when considering elect-
oral fraud we observe that voting behaviour does not exactly follow the same pattern,
independently of the order. This might be due to the fact that, even in the absence
of any framing, the inclusion of electoral fraud could already be perceived as a salient
phenomenon, that differently affects behaviour depending on whether it is present from
the beginning or not. We thus further investigate the role of the order of the sessions
by means of a regression analysis, which enables us to capture the individual level of
heterogeneity that characterizes our data.
In Table 3 we report the marginal effects of a series of regression models to test our
hypotheses, while additional robustness checks are provided in the Appendix. In Table
3 we include all the experimental sessions in our analysis.15
15In the Appendix B we restrict our analysis to the Order sessions, in particular for the fixed effects
models, since in these specifications the time-invariant variables are automatically omitted and we thus
cannot include the variable ”Order” as a control.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
FraudI 0.08995∗∗∗ 0.09265∗∗∗ 0.08881∗∗∗ 0.08898∗∗∗
(0.01104) (0.01567) (0.01123) (0.01559)
FraudII 0.11122∗∗∗ 0.12899∗∗∗ 0.11012∗∗∗ 0.12448∗∗∗
(0.01548) (0.02333) (0.01528) (0.02249)
Majority -0.03301∗∗ -0.02526 -0.03517∗∗ -0.02937
(0.01505) (0.01919) (0.01514) (0.01995)
Voting cost -0.01738∗∗∗ -0.01738∗∗∗ -0.01538∗∗∗ -0.01538∗∗∗
(0.00048) (0.00048) (0.00030) (0.00030)
Experience -0.00117 -0.00108 -0.00106 -0.00099
(0.00139) (0.00138) (0.00137) (0.00137)
Electoral victories 0.00072 0.00056 0.00047 0.00035
(0.00234) (0.00233) (0.00233) (0.00232)
FraudI*Majority -0.00403 -0.00028
(0.01994) (0.02063)
FraudII*Majority -0.02692 -0.02207
(0.02876) (0.02895)
Risk Aversion 0.00016 0.00017
(0.00603) (0.00604)
Mean of type -0.45545∗∗ -0.45312∗∗
(0.22307) (0.22259)
Mean of voting cost 0.01110∗ 0.01107∗
(0.00608) (0.00608)
Mean of electoral victories 0.01204∗∗∗ 0.01209∗∗∗
(0.00445) (0.00445)
Order -0.03856 -0.03840
(0.02338) (0.02338)
Observations 16200 16200 16200 16200
(Pseudo) R2 0.3430 0.3431 0.3059 0.3060
Chi-squared or F 268.62 224.21 642.68 775.14
Prob>chi2/F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3: Regression table, Neutral Treatment. Fixed Effects Linear regression model
for panel data: (1) and (2). Correlated Random Effects Probit model: (3) and (4). In
all models errors are clustered at the individual level.
In all models, the dependent variable is Vote, a dummy variable which takes value one
when the participant votes and zero when the participant decides to abstain. First, in
models (1) and (2), we present the results of a linear model for panel data with fixed
effects and clusters at the level of the individual to control for the autocorrelation.
In models (3) and (4) we present the results of the Correlated Random Effects (CRE)
model first proposed by Mundlak (1978), combining the advantages of both fixed and
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random-effects models. In particular, we also include the mean of time-dependent vari-
ables as independent variables, identified as Mean of voting cost, Mean of type and Mean
of electoral victories. Moreover, in order to drop the serial independence assumption,
we also cluster the standard errors at the individual level to make our inference robust
to autocorrelation.
Our explanatory variables are the following. Neutral Treatment is equal to one for the
Neutral treatment and zero otherwise while FraudI and FraudII are equal to one when
participants experience the corresponding level of fraudulent intervention and zero other-
wise: the omitted dummy variable is the Baseline condition thus the coefficients have to
be considered with respect to this condition. Majority is equal to one if the participant is
a member of the majority group and zero otherwise and Voting cost is a categorical vari-
able that indicates the randomly assigned voting cost in each round of the experiment.
Experience takes into consideration the round of the experiment subjects are playing, in
order to allow for learning. In models (3) and (4) we specifically control for the order of
the sessions, by including the binary variable Order in the regressions. Moreover, in all
models, Electoral victories stands for the sum of the individual’s elections won period by
period, thus controlling for the acquired wealth of participants across time.16 In models
(3) and (4) we include a measure of individual risk aversion.17 In models (2) and (4)
we also include the interaction terms FraudI*Majority and FraudII*Majority in order
to investigate whether, respectively in Fraud I and Fraud II conditions, the difference
in voting behaviour between the majority and the minority group changes with respect
16More specifically, in models (3) and (4), it is important to include this variable in order to correctly
identify the effect of the order of the sessions, since participants’ likelihood of winning, when being in
the minority and majority group, is also potentially affected by the Order of the sessions. We thank an
anonymous referee for providing us with this intuition.
17In particular, each subject has to make ten choices between two lotteries, one is more remunerative
but more risky, while the other is safer but provides the subject with a lower amount of earnings. See
Holt and Laury (2002) for more details on the test. We measure risk aversion as the number of safe
choices made by the individual, ignoring possible switching from one type of lottery to another. The
analysis reported in this paper changes very little if, as alternative, we drop the 52 subjects who switched
more than once from B back to A or vice-versa, the analysis results in minor changes. More specifically,
in both models 3 and 4, the coefficient for mean of voting cost is not significant and mean of electoral
victories is significant at 5% level.
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to the Baseline treatment.
First, our variables of interest FraudI (limited fraudulent intervention with 2 ballots)
and FraudII (extended fraudulent intervention with 5 ballots) considerably increase the
probability of voting. Second, we observe that the coefficient of the Majority variable is
significant in both models (1) and (3): in the the Neutral treatment the minority group
is more likely to vote than the majority one. FraudI*Majority and FraudII*Majority
are never significant, suggesting that the difference in voting behaviour between the
minority and the majority group does not depend on the level of electoral integrity.
Finally, in models (3) and (4) we observe that neither the order of the sessions nor the
acquired wealth of participants across time significantly affect the probability of voting.
5.2 Framing treatment
In the previous section we presented evidence of voting behaviour when fake votes are
added to the ballot box. Lower turnout is not necessarily observed when comparing
elections with and without electoral fraud. In the Neutral treatment we explicitly focus
on participants’ reactions in a context-free environment. Since the use of abstract terms
may eliminate important behavioural considerations that are inherent in elections char-
acterized by an unfair voting procedure, in this section we present a treatment variation
designed to investigate the influence of social and psychological factors in affecting vot-
ing behaviour. To this end, the entire experiment is framed as an election in the Framing
Treatment. In Levine and Palfrey (2007), the authors tested for the effect of framing
in their voting experiment but with a limited number of observations (two additional
sessions with 9 subjects in each). Our aim is not only to provide additional and more
robust evidence on the possible effect of framing the experiment as an election on voter
turnout (as in our Baseline condition) but, more importantly, to investigate the effect
of framing the experiment as an election with ballot box stuffing (as in our Fraud I and
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Fraud II conditions), which is the main objective of our paper.18
162 subjects participated in the Framing treatment, featuring 6 sessions, each with 27
participants. As in the Neutral treatment, 4 Order sessions were characterized by a
decreasing quality of elections (i.e. Baseline, Fraud I, Fraud II) while 2 additional ses-
sions were implemented with a Reverse Order (i.e. Fraud II, Fraud I, Baseline), as a
robustness check. The experimental procedures, length and average earnings were the
same as in the Neutral treatment. In what follows, we describe the main findings on
voter turnout with respect to the Baseline, Fraud I and Fraud II conditions.
First, in Table 4, we report the turnout rates under the Baseline condition. As it were
the case in the Neutral treatment, we observe over-voting with respect to our theoretical
predictions (WSR, Order sessions: p=0.068 and p=0.066 for the majority and minority
group, respectively; Order and Reverse order sessions: p=0.028 and p=0.334 for the
majority and minority groups, respectively; the difference fails to reach significance in
the Reverse Order sessions).
Experimental Results Framing Theoretical
Treatment Equilibrium
Majority
Order
0.342
0.228
(0.010)
Reverse Order
0.308
(0.008)
Both
0.331
(0.010)
Minority
Order
0.317
0.270
(0.025)
Reverse Order
0.238
(0.072)
Both
0.291
(0.030)
Table 4: Turnout rates under the Baseline condition in the Framing treatment (standard
error in parentheses).
18In the instructions we explicitly refer to parties, voting, abstention and ballot box stuffing. See the
Appendix for the English version of the experimental instructions.
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More interestingly, when comparing turnout between the majority and minority group
in the Baseline condition, there is no evidence of greater support for the underdog can-
didate in the Framing treatment (Order sessions: p=0.136, one-sided). Furthermore,
the majority party is significantly more likely to vote than the minority one both when
considering all sessions together and when limiting our analysis to the Reverse Order
ones (Reverse Order: p=0.09, one-sided; Order & Reverse Order: p=0.058, one-sided).
Result 4 summarizes our main findings:
Result 4.The Framing treatment provides no support for Hypothesis 1: the minor-
ity group is not voting at a higher rate than the majority group.
Framing the experiment as an election has some behavioural implications. Voters in ma-
jority and minority groups respond differently to such framing. A plausible explanation
is the relationship between the electoral frame and the phenomenon of the Incumbency
advantage (Freier, 2015, Redmond and Regan, 2015). Previous studies have provided
evidence that people have a tendency to vote for the winner or want to be associated
with the winner of the elections (Morton and Ou, 2015, Morton et al., 2015). In the
Framing treatment, being being part of the minority party may make subjects less likely
to vote, since the probability of being associated with the winner is lower.
Figure 3 graphs the voter turnout rate observed in the Baseline, Fraud I and Fraud II
conditions in the Framing treatment.
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Figure 3: Voter turnout across periods in the Baseline, Fraud I and Fraud II parts in
the Framing treatment.
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First, we observe that the turnout significantly increases in Fraud I with respect to the
Baseline condition, independently of the party (Order sessions, p=0.068 ). The same
result hold for both the Order and Reverse Order session together (p=0.028 ), while the
difference in turnout fails to reach significance in the Reverse Order sessions. Second,
in Fraud II, voting behaviour follows the opposite pattern than theoretically hypothes-
ised when considering the Framing treatment. Both if restricting the analysis to the
Order sessions and if also including the Reverse Order sessions, voter turnout increases
in Fraud II condition compared to Fraud I condition, respectively from 41.96 to 43.89
and from 40.25 to 45.26: voting behaviour observed in our data does not support our
predictions when the experiment is framed as an election since there is no significant
difference in total turnout between Fraud I and Fraud II. More interestingly, in the
Framing treatment, the majority group participated in voting at a significantly higher
rate than in the Fraud I condition (WSR test. Order sessions: p=0.068; Order & Re-
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verse Order sessions: p=0.028).19
Result 5. In the Framing treatment hypothesis H2 is rejected: voters do not decrease
their participation in the elections as the level of electoral fraud increases. Moreover,
voter turnout in the majority group is significantly higher in Fraud II than in Fraud I.
However, the difference fails to reach significance when restricting the analysis to the
Reverse Order sessions, most probably due to the limited sample size. In the following
individual level analysis we therefore investigate whether voter participation is actually
differently affected by the experience of an increase or a decrease in the quality of the
voting institution.
Table 5 reports the results of a set of regression models analysing voting behaviour in
the Framing treatment. In all models standard errors are clustered at the individual
level and the same independent variables already described for Table 3 are included in
the analysis.20
We first observe that both FraudI and FraudII have a significant effect in increasing the
probability of voting, in all models.
On the other hand with respect to the Neutral treatment, in models (1) and (3) the
coefficient of the Majority variable is positive and significant, providing evidence that
framing the experiment as an election increases the willingness to vote of those in the ma-
jority party, with respect to the member of the minority party. Moreover, in model (2)
and (4), that also include the interaction terms FraudI*Majority and FraudII*Majority
19Differences in voter turnout between the Neutral and Framing treatment are mostly observed only
with a higher level of electoral fraud, but not for lower levels. Our data thus provide indirect evidence
that having loaded instructions rather than neutral ones does not necessarily affect voters’ behaviour
by influencing their beliefs about others’ turnout. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that a proper beliefs
elicitation setting is needed in the experimental design in order to clearly distinguish between these two
forces.
20In table B1 (models (2) and (4)) in the Appendix we replicate the analysis made in models (1) and
(2) of Table 5 but we limit our analysis to the Order sessions. Moreover, in Table B2 in the Appendix
we also report the coefficients of a Fixed Effect non-linear (logit) model for panel data.
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in the regression, the coefficient of Majority is positive and significant, meaning that,
in the Baseline condition, the Majority party is significantly less likely to vote than
the Minority one when the experiment is framed as an election, differently to what was
theoretically hypothesised.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FraudI 0.09508∗∗∗ 0.11823∗∗∗ 0.09572∗∗∗ 0.12171∗∗∗
(0.01159) (0.01887) (0.01140) (0.01890)
FraudII 0.14454∗∗∗ 0.16702∗∗∗ 0.14168∗∗∗ 0.15844∗∗∗
(0.01516) (0.02104) (0.01453) (0.02080)
Majority 0.02572∗ 0.04296∗∗ 0.02627∗ 0.04286∗
(0.01499) (0.02169) (0.01532) (0.02289)
Voting cost -0.01665∗∗∗ -0.01665∗∗∗ -0.01486∗∗∗ -0.01486∗∗∗
(0.00047) (0.00047) (0.00032) (0.00032)
Experience -0.00111 -0.00103 -0.00157 -0.00151
(0.00144) (0.00144) (0.00140) (0.00140)
Electoral victories 0.00025 0.00012 0.00086 0.00075
(0.00237) (0.00238) (0.00231) (0.00232)
FraudI*Majority -0.03477 -0.03886
(0.02313) (0.02406)
FraudII*Majority -0.03418 -0.02518
(0.03018) (0.03024)
Risk Aversion -0.00204 -0.00204
(0.00719) (0.00719)
Mean of type -0.02099 -0.01443
(0.27004) (0.2699)
Mean of voting cost 0.01039∗ 0.01040∗
(0.00580) (0.00580)
Mean of electoral victories 0.00811 0.00802
(0.00572) (0.00569)
Order 0.01843 0.01864
(0.02429) (0.02428)
Observations 16200 16200 16200 16200
(Pseudo) R2 0.3239 0.3242 0.2824 0.2827
Chi-squared or F 262.85 199.09 573.83 574.56
Prob>chi2/F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5: Regression table, Neutral Treatment. Fixed Effects Linear regression model
for panel data: (1) and (2). Correlated Random Effects Probit model: (3) and (4). In
all models errors are clustered at the individual level.
Finally, as was the case for the Neutral treatment, the order of the sessions has no sig-
nificant effect on individuals’ willingness to vote, even when controlling for the number
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of electoral victories. 21
5.3 Electoral fraud and win probability
Does the incumbent win more often than the other candidate? Is electoral fraud a good
strategy for winning elections? In order to answer these questions, in this section we
look at the probability of the minority party winning the elections depending on the
extent of the electoral fraud and on framing. In the analysis we first focus on both
the Order and Reverse Order sessions, and then also provide statistical evidence when
limiting the analysis to the Order or to the Reverse Order ones, respectively.
In Figure 4 we report the probability of winning the election for the minority party
across treatments and with respect to the model’s predictions.
In the Neutral treatment the results of the experiment are closer to our predictions
than when considering the Framing treatment. In the Baseline condition the underdog
candidate wins in 13% of the total number of elections when considering all sessions
of the Neutral treatment but only in 7.5% of elections in the Framing one (MW test.
Order & Reverse Order sessions: p=0.044).22 This evidence is consistent with our pre-
vious result showing that the majority party over-votes when the experiment is framed
as an election with respect to a situation where labels are abstract. When adding two
fake ballots to the minority group, as expected, we observe a significant increase in the
winning frequency in both the Framing treatment, to 25.67% (Wilcoxon test. Order &
Reverse Order sessions: p=0.028), and in the Neutral one, to 27.33% (Wilcoxon test.
Order & Reverse Order sessions: p=0.028).23
21As in Table 3, when measuring risk aversion, we are ignoring possible switching from one type of
lottery to another. If instead we drop the 52 subjects who switched more than once from B back to
A or vice-versa, the analysis results in minor changes. More specifically, in both models 3 and 4, the
coefficient for mean of voting cost is not significant and majority is significant at 5% level.
22A similar pattern is observed when restricting the analysis to the Order (and Reverse Order) sessions,
where the the underdog candidate wins in 12%(15%) and 7%(8.5%) of the elections in the Neutral and
Framing treatment, respectively. MW test. Order sessions: p=0.145; Reverse Order sessions: p=0.221.
23The difference between the Baseline and Fraud I is significant (p=0.068) also when considering only
the Order sessions (in the Framing treatment and Neutral treatment, the probability of winning the
elections increases to 33% and 32.5%, respectively), but not when limiting the analysis to the Reverse
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Figure 4: Probability of winning the elections - Minority party.
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In Fraud I the frequency of the minority party winning the elections in the Framing
and in the Neutral treatment is not significantly different. However, when introducing
a higher level of electoral fraud, in Fraud II, the minority party is less likely to win the
elections in the Framing treatment than in the Neutral treatment: when considering
both the Order and Reverse Order sessions together the frequency of victories increases
to 57.67% and to 75.33% in the Framing and Neutral treatment, respectively (MW test.
Order & Reverse Order sessions: p=0.092).24, 25
Order ones, even if the observed pattern is similar (the probability of winning increases to 11% in the
Framing treatment and to 17% in the Neutral treatment). )
24A similar outcome is observed when restricting our analysis to the Order or to the Reverse Order
sessions, even if the difference fails to reach significance (Order sessions: p=0.108; Reverse Order sessions:
p=0.439).
25In the current analysis we consider the frequency of winning the elections by the minority party with
respect to the total number of elections, also including the tied elections, by comparing data grouped at
the session level. When excluding tied elections from our analysis we observe almost the same results,
except for the fact that the difference in the probability of winning the elections in the Fraud II condition
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In Table 6, a set of regression models provides additional evidence on the role of beha-
vioural reaction to electoral fraud. Our dependent variable is Minority wins, which is
equal to one when the Minority group wins the election and zero otherwise.
First, in model (1) and (2), we present the results of a Fixed Effects linear probability
model clustering the errors at the individual level, in order to control for non-observable
characteristics of individuals and to correct for autocorrelation bias. In particular, in
model (1) we restrict our analysis to the Neutral treatment while in model (2) we focus
on the Framing treatment. In model (3) and (4) we report the results of a set of pooled
probit models on the same variables of interest, where we also control for the order of
the Baseline, Fraud I and Fraud II conditions.
In models (1) and (2) in both the Neutral and Framing treatments, the minority party
increases his winning probability with low and high levels of electoral fraud. In model
(3) previous results are confirmed and we also observe that the probability that the
minority wins the election is significantly higher in the Framing treatment than in the
Neutral treatment, as shown by the significance of the coefficient of the Neutral Treat-
ment variable . The effect of the electoral fraud depends on the treatment, as shown in
Model (4). The coefficient of the interaction term Neutral*FraudI is negative and sig-
nificant since the probability of winning with respect to the Baseline condition is more
likely to increase in the Framing treatment than in the Neutral one (respectively, from
7.5 to 25.67 and from 13 to 27.33). The coefficient of Fraud II is positive and signi-
ficant showing that, with respect to the Baseline treatment, adding five fake ballots to
the minority party is less effective in increasing the probability of winning the elections
for the minority group in the Framing treatment than in the Neutral one (respectively,
from 25.67 to 57.67 and from 27.33 to 75.33). As shown in the previous paragraph the
majority group votes more often when the experiment is framed as an election with five
fake ballots than when it is framed in neutral terms, counteracting the effectiveness of
between the Framing and Neutral treatment is significant also when considering only the Order sessions
(MW test, two-sided, p=0.081).
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fraud in winning the election.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FraudI 0.155000∗∗∗ 0.165833∗∗∗ 0.173090∗∗∗ 0.212648∗∗∗
(0.014704) (0.017226) (0.011327) (0.014042)
FraudII 0.541667∗∗∗ 0.406667∗∗∗ 0.408519∗∗∗ 0.387114∗∗∗
(0.013966) (0.021218) (0.008559) (0.015984)
Experience-FraudI -0.000897 0.001218∗ 0.000779 0.000754
(0.000563) (0.000651) (0.000473) (0.000465)
Experience-FraudII 0.006282∗∗∗ 0.007308∗∗∗ 0.004731∗∗∗ 0.004813∗∗∗
(0.000600) (0.001019) (0.000490) (0.000507)
Neutral Tr. 0.087864∗∗∗ 0.098241∗∗∗
(0.005241) (0.009569)
Order 0.084268∗∗∗ 0.084048∗∗∗
(0.005122) (0.005089)
Neutral*FraudI -0.076257∗∗∗
(0.014112)
Neutral*FraudII 0.044608∗∗
(0.018306)
Observations 16200 16200 32400 32400
Pseudo) R2 0.3449 0.2601 0.2097 0.2123
Wald chi2 or F 11677 3287 3921.72 4591.75
Prob>chi2/F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 6: Regression table. Win probabilty, minority group. Linear model for panel data
with Fixed Effects: Neutral Treatment (1) and Framing Treatment (2). Probit model:
(3) and (4). In all models errors are clustered at the level of individual.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that electoral fraud might increase rather than decrease
voter turnout. While a high turnout is usually considered as a signal of a fair election
we show, by means of a laboratory experiment, that this is not necessarily the case.
Our strategic costly voting model predicts an increase in turnout when the fraudulent
intervention is moderate and a sharp drop in participation whenever fraud is pervasive.
In the laboratory we test the model’s predictions in a very simple setting, investigating
voters’ behaviour in an environment characterized by a decreasing (increasing) electoral
integrity, where the level of electoral fraud is known and exogenously imposed.
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In the Neutral treatment, when the entire setting is defined in abstract terms, the ex-
perimental results confirm the first part of our theoretical predictions. However, when
a more pervasive fraudulent intervention affects the electoral procedure, our theoretical
results are not totally matched: a decrease in participation rates is observed when going
from a low to a high level of ballot-box stuffing but still turnout is higher than when
full electoral integrity is assured.
In the Framing treatment, when the experiment is explicitly framed as an election, not
only is the first part of our theoretical predictions not matched but we also observe that
a higher level of electoral fraud increases turnout among the majority group (compared
with a low level of fraud). We believe that such behaviour is an attempt by the ma-
jority group, that is negatively affected by the illicit intervention, to react to an unfair
procedure, even if such action is costly.
Our results are not always matched when limiting the analysis to an electoral system
characterized by decreasing integrity (i.e. from a high to a low level of ballot-box stuff-
ing), suggesting that people may react differently when experiencing an increasing vs.
decreasing quality of institutions.
Our theoretical predictions are not are not fully reflected in our subjects’ behaviour.
These differences call for explanations that are beyond pure mistakes in strategic re-
sponses. In particular, our model does not allow for the individuals’ intrinsic sense of
(procedural) fairness, which has been shown to be an important determinant of the in-
dividuals’ decision making process (Bolton et al., 2005), to affect voter turnout. While
in the Neutral treatment, even in the absence of any framing, the inclusion of electoral
fraud could already be perceived as a salient phenomenon, in the Framing treatment
such an effect is possibly magnified.
Our findings imply that high turnout rates do not necessarily signal that elections are
conducted openly and fairly, differently to what has often been observed in empirical
studies. However, the complexity of the real world and the unobservability of many
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important variables call for the implementation of the experimental method to allow
a better understanding of whether a high turnout rate is actually a good indicator of
electoral integrity. Being the first to provide evidence on the role of electoral fraud in
affecting voter turnout in a controlled environment, where ceteris paribus comparisons
are possible, we decided to keep our setting as simple as possible, abstracting away
from many elements of real life in order to cleanly answer our research question. Our
experiment can be easily modified to take into account the current limitations of our
study. For instance, often in the real world people are confronted with situations where
the amount of illicit behaviour in elections is uncertain, rather than having clear know-
ledge about the level of the illegitimate intervention. Furthermore, we do not consider
the relevance of candidates’ intentions to illicitly influence the electoral outcome as a
possible dimension affecting voters’ behaviour. It would be thus interesting to test for
the endogeneity of electoral fraud. Finally, it would be fascinating if the perception of
electoral fraud were found to be sufficient in positively affecting voter turnout: we might
observe that candidates operate to influence this perception, rather than to actually rig
the electoral system. This type of research can potentially inform current research on
the role of fake news, aimed at influencing perception of electoral fraud.
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7 Compliance with Ethical Standards
In this paper we implemented a set of laboratory experiments with human subjects run
at the University of Milano Bicocca. The study did not involve any risk for participants.
Informed consent was obtained following the procedures of the laboratory at the Uni-
versity of Milano Bicocca and possible consequences of the study were explained to all
participants, who were free to quit the study at any time with no penalties.
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Appendix A
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
The instructions written in red refer to the NEUTRAL treatment, while the instruc-
tions written in italics green refer to the FRAMING treatment.
SESSION 1
SCREEN 1
Thanks for agreeing to participate in this research experiment.
During the experiment we require your complete, undistracted attention. We ask you to
follow the instructions carefully. Turn off your mobile phones. You cannot use mobile
phones and you cannot talk with other participants. If you have any questions please
raise your hand.
The choices you are going to make during the experiment will be completely anonymous.
It will be impossible for those analyzing the data to know participants identity.
For your participation, you will be paid in cash, at the end of the experiment. Different
participants may earn different amounts. What you earn depends partly on your deci-
sions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance. So it is important that
you listen carefully, and fully understand the instructions before we begin.
There will be a short comprehension quiz after the instructions reading, which you all
need to pass before we can begin the paid sessions.
If you encounter any difficulty during the questionnaire, please raise your hand.
SCREEN 2
Everyone will be paid in private and you are under no obligation to tell others how
much you earned. Your earnings during the experiment are denominated in POINTS.
Your EURO earnings are determined by multiplying your earnings in POINTS by a
conversion rate. In this experiment, the conversion rate is 0.0012, meaning that 100
POINTS is worth 12 cents.
The experiment consists of 2 different sessions. Each session will consist of 50 rounds.
At the end of the last paid session, you will be paid the sum of what you have earned in
the two sessions : the points you have earned will be converted into Euro and privately
given to you in cash.
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SCREEN 3
Now we are explaining you the detailed instructions for the first session of the experi-
ment.
The first session consists of 50 rounds.
At the beginning of each round of the first session you will be randomly assigned to the
ALPHA or BETA group party .
You will be then informed about which group party you are part of and about the num-
ber of members of each group party .
ALPHA group party has 9 members and the BETA group party has 18 members.
Moreover, to each participant it will be also randomly assigned a bonus Y. We will
explain what this means in a moment.
After that, you will be asked to choose one option out of two: option ”X” to vote or
option ”Y” to abstain. In order to make a choice you just have to select one of the two
options and click on the OK button on your screen.
Your earnings depend on your choice of either option ”X” to vote or option ”Y” to
abstain and on which group party . has the most members choosing option ”X” to vote.
After every participant has made a choice between the two options, your earnings will
be showed on your screen.
SCREEN 4
How are your earnings determined in every period?
It is very important that you understand this, so please listen carefully.
Suppose you choose option ”X” to vote. If your group party has more members choosing
option ”X” to vote than the other group party , then you will earn 105 points; if both
groups parties have the same number of members choosing option ”X” to vote, then
you will earn 55 points, and if the other group party has more members choosing option
”X” to vote, than your group party , then you will earn 5 points.
Alternatively, suppose you choose option ”Y” to abstain. If your group party has more
members choosing option ”X” to vote than the other group party , then you will earn
105 points plus your Y bonus; if both groups parties have the same number of members
choosing option ”X” to vote, then you will earn 55 points plus your Y bonus, and if
the other group party has more members choosing option ”X” to vote than your group
party , then you will earn 5 points plus your Y bonus.
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The amount of your Y-bonus is assigned randomly by the computer and is shown on
your screen. In any given round you have an equal chance of being assigned any Y-bonus
between 0 and 55 points. Your Y-bonus in each round does not depend on your Y-bonus
or decisions in previous rounds, or on the Y-bonuses and decisions of other participants.
Since Y-bonuses are assigned separately for each participant, different participants will
typically have different Y-bonuses. While you are told your own Y-bonus, you are
never told the Y-bonuses of other participants. You only know that each of the other
participants has a Y-bonus that is some number between 0 and 55.
SCREEN 5
Here is an example: Suppose that one member of the ALPHA group party choose option
”X” to vote and two members of the BETA group party choose option ”X” to vote.
Then the BETA group party has more members choosing option ”X” to vote than
ALPHA. Each member of the ALPHA group party who chose option ”X” to vote earns
5 points; each member of the ALPHA group party who chose option ”Y” to abstain
earns 5 points plus his or her own personal Y-bonus ; the members of the BETA group
party who chose option ”X” to vote earn 105 points, and each member of the BETA
group party who chose option ”Y” to abstain earns 105 points plus his or her personal
Y-bonus.
The bottom of the screen contains a history panel. During the various sessions and
rounds, this panel will be updated to reflect the history of your past sessions.
After you and the other participants have all made your choices of option ”X” to vote
or option ”Y” to abstain, the screen will change to highlight the row corresponding to
your own choice, and the column of the group party which had the greatest number of
members choose option ”X” to vote. At the end of each round until the session ends,
you will be randomly divided between groups parties, and will have the opportunity to
choose between option ”X” to vote and option ”Y” to abstain. In other words, you will
not necessarily be in the same group party during each round.
SCREEN 6
If you have any questions at this time, please raise your hand.
Now you are going to answer a quiz to be sure everyone has correctly understood the
instructions. Please read each question carefully and check the correct answer.
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Once everyone has answered the questions correctly, you may all go on to the second
stage of the quiz. After successfully completing the second round of questions, we will
commence with the first session.
If you have any difficulties with the quiz or have other questions please your hand.
Participants answer the quiz.
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QUIZ
1. How many members are in the Alpha group party?
(a) 9
(b) 18
(c) 27
2. How many members are in the Beta group party?
(a) 9
(b) 18
(c) 27
3. Are group party assignments randomly reassigned after every round?
(a) yes
(b) no
4. Is your Y bonus necessarily the same as other members of your group party?
(a) yes
(b) no
5. Suppose in round 1 you are assigned to b a member of the Beta group party .
Moreover, suppose your randomly assigned Y bonus in this round is equal to 21
points.
• Suppose you choose option ”X” to vote.
Totally (you are included), three members of the Beta group party and four
members of the Alpha group party chose option ”X” to vote. How many
points do you earn in this round?
(a) 5
(b) 21
(c) 26
(d) 55
5
(e) 76
(f) 105
• Suppose you choose option ”Y” to abstain.
Totally (you are included), four members of the Beta group party and four
members of the Alpha group party chose option ”X” to vote. How many
points do you earn in this round?
(a) 5
(b) 21
(c) 26
(d) 55
(e) 76
(f) 105
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READY
Let me summarize those rules before we start. Please listen carefully.
In each round of this session, 9 participants will be randomly assigned to the Alpha
group party and 18 participants will be assigned to the Beta group party .
You may choose option ”X” to vote or option ”Y” to abstain.
If you choose option ”X” to vote, your payoff will be 105 POINTS if your group party
has more members choosing option ”X” to vote than the other group party , 5 POINTS
if your group party has fewer members choosing option ”X” to vote, and 55 POINTS if
it is a tie. If you choose option ”Y” to abstain, you will also receive the Y-bonus shown
on your screen. There will be 50 rounds in this session.
After each round, group party assignments will be randomly reshuﬄed. Therefore, in
some rounds you will be in the Alpha group party and in other rounds you will be in
the Beta group party .
In either case, everyone is told which group party they are in before making a choice of
option ”X” to vote or option ”Y” to abstain.
Please begin. (Play rounds 1 to 50).
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SESSION 2
We will now begin session 2.
FRAUD
SCREEN 7
Session 1 is now over.
We will now begin session 2.
The second session will be slightly different from the first session. Let me summarize
those rules before we start. Please listen carefully.
Differently than in the previous session, now a vote rigging is affecting the electoral
system. in each of the first 25 rounds of this second session, 2 units votes will be auto-
matically added to the sum of option ”X” votes by the ALPHA group party in order to
compute which group party has the highest number of option ”X” votes.
As in the previous session you will be informed whether you are part of the ALPHA or
BETA group party and of the amount of your Y bonus.
You may choose option ”X” to vote or option ”Y” to abstain. After you and the other
participants have all made your choices of option ”X” to vote or option ”Y” to abstain
the screen will change to highlight the row corresponding to your own choice, and the
column of the group which had the greatest number of members who choose option ”X”
votes.
READY2
In each round of this session, 9 participants will be randomly assigned to the Alpha
group party and 18 participants will be assigned to the Beta group party .
You may choose option ”X” to vote or option ”Y” to abstain.
If you choose option ”X” to vote, your payoff will be 105 POINTS if your group party
has more members choosing option ”X” to vote than the other group party , 5 POINTS
if your group party has fewer members choosing option ”X” to vote, and 55 POINTS if
it is a tie. If you choose option ”Y” to abstain, you will also receive the Y-bonus shown
on your screen. There will be 50 rounds in this session.
After each round, group party assignments will be randomly reshuﬄed. Therefore, in
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some rounds you will be in the Alpha group party and in other rounds you will be in
the Beta group party .
In either case, everyone is told which group party they are in before making a choice of
option ”X” to vote or option ”Y” to abstain.
Now, because of the vote rigging, in order to compute which group party
has the highest number of option ”X” selected votes, in every round 2 units
votes, will be automatically added to the ALPHA group party . Please begin.
(Play rounds 51 to 75)
SCREEN 8
In each of the first 25 rounds of this second session, there is still a vote rigging af-
fecting the electoral process: 5 units votes will be now automatically added to the sum
of option ”X” votes by the ALPHA group party in order to compute which group party
has the highest number of option ”X” votes.
As in the previous session you will be informed whether you are part of the ALPHA or
BETA group party and of the amount of your Y bonus.
You may choose option ”X” to vote or option ”Y” to abstain. After you and the other
participants have all made your choices of option ”X” to vote or option ”Y” to abstain
the screen will change to highlight the row corresponding to your own choice, and the
column of the group which had the greatest number of members who choose option ”X”
votes.
READY3
Let me summarize those rules before we start. Please listen carefully.
In each round of this session, 9 participants will be randomly assigned to the Alpha
group party and 18 participants will be assigned to the Beta group party .
You may choose option ”X” to vote or option ”Y” to abstain.
If you choose option ”X” to vote, your payoff will be 105 POINTS if your group party
has more members choosing option ”X” to vote than the other group party , 5 POINTS
if your group party has fewer members choosing option ”X” to vote, and 55 POINTS if
it is a tie. If you choose option ”Y” to abstain, you will also receive the Y-bonus shown
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on your screen. There will be 50 rounds in this session.
After each round, group (party) assignments will be randomly reshuﬄed. Therefore, in
some rounds you will be in the Alpha group party and in other rounds you will be in
the Beta group party .
In either case, everyone is told which group party they are in before making a choice of
option ”X” to vote or option ”Y” to abstain.
Now, because of the vote rigging, in order to compute which group party
has the highest number of option ”X” selected votes, in every round 5 units
votes, will be automatically added to the ALPHA group party .
Please Begin. (Play rounds 75 to 100)
Session 2 is now over.
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SESSION 3 – H & L
In the next screen you will be asked to make 10 decisions. Each decision is a paired
choice between ”Option A” and ”Option B.”
You will make ten choices and record these in the final column, but only one of them
will be used in the end to determine your earnings.
Before you start making your ten choices, please let me explain how these choices will
affect your earnings for this part of the experiment.
After you have made all of your choices, the computer will randomly extract a random
number between 1 and 10 included for two times. The first randomly extracted number
is used to select one of the ten decisions to be used, and the second to determine what
your payoff is for the option you chose, A or B, for the particular decision selected.
Even though you will make ten decisions, only one of these will end up affecting your
earnings, but you will not know in advance which decision will be used.
Obviously, each decision has an equal chance of being used in the end.
Now, please look at Decision 1 at the top. Option A pays 2 Euro if the second random
number extracted is 1, and it pays 1.60 Euro if the second random extracted number
is 2-10. Option B yields 3.85 Euro if the second random number extracted is 1, and it
pays 0.10 Euro if it is 2-10.
The other Decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the chances of
the higher payoff for each option increase. In fact, for Decision 10 in the bottom row,
the second random number to extracted will not be needed since each option pays the
highest payoff for sure, so your choice here is between 2 Euro or 3.85 Euro.
To summarize, you will make ten choices: for each decision row you will have to choose
between Option A and Option B.
You may choose A for some decision rows and B for other rows, and you may change
your decisions and make them in any order.
When you are finished, the computer will extract a first random number between 1
and 10 to decide which of the ten Decisions will be used. Then the computer will ex-
tract a second random number between 1 and 10 to determine your money earnings
for the Option you chose for that Decision. Earnings (in Euro) for this choice will be
added to your previous earnings, and you will be paid all earnings in cash when we finish.
Are there any questions? Now you may begin making your choices. Please do not
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talk with anyone while we are doing this; raise your hand if you have a question.
Please Begin. (Play H & L test for risk aversion).
Once it is finished, start the demographic questionnaire.
QUESTIONNAIRE
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Appendix B
In the following tables we integrate the analysis contained in Table 3 and 5 of the main
text, where the voting decision is investigated by including observations of both the
Order and Reverse Order sessions.
First, in Table B1, we report the coefficients of a set of Fixed Effects Linear regression
models for panel data, only including observations of the Order sessions. In all models,
errors are clustered at the individual level. More specifically, in models (1) and (3) of
Table B1 we replicate the same analysis of the Neutral treatment made in Table 3 in
the main text (models 1-2). We observe that our results with respect to the Neutral
treatment are unchanged when limiting our analysis to the Order sessions of the Neutral
treatment. In models (2) and (4) we analyse the Framing treatment, as in model (1)
and (2) of Table 5 in the main text, with the only difference of limiting our analysis
to the Order sessions. The most relevant difference is observed in model (2) where the
coefficient of Majority has the expected sign but does not reach significance. Moreover,
in model (4), the coefficient of the interaction term FraudI*Majority is significant while
the coefficient of Majority is not, differently than in Table .5 In table B2, the significant
coefficient of FraudI*Majority indicates that the effect of framing the fraudulent inter-
vention as a ballot-box stuffing differently affects the minority and the majority group
in the Fraud I game, while this is not the case if we also include in the analysis the
Reverse Order sessions.
In models (1) and (2) of Table B2, we report the results of a Fixed Effects non-linear
(logit) model for panel data. In specification (1) and (2) we include observations of
both the Order and Reverse Order sessions of the Neutral and Framing treatment, re-
spectively. In models (3) and (4) we replicate the previous analysis but only including
observations of the Order sessions. We do not observe big differences with respect to
the results reported in models (1) of Table 3 and 5, respectively for the Neutral and
Framing treatments. In particular, the most relevant difference is noted when limiting
our analysis to the Order sessions of the Framing treatment: the majority party is not
more likely to vote than the minority one, on average (i.e. without allowing for the
presence of electoral fraud to differently affect the majority party‘s voting behavior).
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Table B.1: Regression table, Fixed Effects Linear regression model for panel data. In
all models errors are clustered at the individual level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Neutral Tr. Framing Tr. Neutral Tr. Framing Tr.
FraudI 0.12287∗∗∗ 0.16347∗∗∗ 0.13539∗∗∗ 0.21454∗∗∗
(0.01755) (0.01882) (0.02271) (0.02739)
FraudII 0.14380∗∗∗ 0.22193∗∗∗ 0.15711∗∗∗ 0.25581∗∗∗
(0.02980) (0.03290) (0.03665) (0.03858)
Majority -0.04385∗∗ 0.00107 -0.03406 0.03307
(0.01904) (0.01706) (0.02391) (0.02686)
Voting cost -0.01729∗∗∗ -0.01686∗∗∗ -0.01729∗∗∗ -0.01687∗∗∗
(0.00062) (0.00055) (0.00062) (0.00055)
Experience -0.00119 -0.00340∗ -0.00113 -0.00332∗
(0.00186) (0.00202) (0.00186) (0.00201)
Electoral victories -0.00014 0.00210 -0.00024 0.00196
(0.00307) (0.00319) (0.00307) (0.00318)
FraudI*Majority -0.01874 -0.07664∗∗
(0.02125) (0.03065)
FraudII*Majority -0.02037 -0.05143
(0.03412) (0.03685)
Observations 10800 10800 10800 10800
R2 0.3363 0.3283 0.3364 0.3292
F 187.73 202.56 161.38 160.96
Prob¿F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Clustered Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.2: Regression table. Logit model for panel data with Fixed effects. Neutral
treatment, all sessions (1) and Order sessions (3); Framing treatment, all sessions (2)
and Order sessions (4).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Neutral Tr. Framing Tr. Neutral Tr. Framing Tr.
FraudI 0.05285∗∗∗ 0.06694∗∗∗ 0.06799∗∗∗ 0.10169∗∗∗
(0.00461) (0.00530) (0.00708) (0.00788)
FraudII 0.06437∗∗∗ 0.09760∗∗∗ 0.08038∗∗∗ 0.13548∗∗∗
(0.00484) (0.00585) (0.01034) (0.01138)
Majority -0.01977∗∗∗ 0.01748∗∗∗ -0.02445∗∗∗ 0.00095
(0.00327) (0.00436) (0.00368) (0.00453)
Voting cost -0.00898∗∗∗ -0.01001∗∗∗ -0.00836∗∗∗ -0.00892∗∗∗
(0.00022) (0.00020) (0.00033) (0.00031)
Experience -0.00066 -0.00080 -0.00069 -0.00203∗∗∗
(0.00044) (0.00057) (0.00053) (0.00066)
Electoral victories 0.00043 0.00023 -0.00002 0.00119
(0.00075) (0.00095) (0.00086) (0.00105)
Observations 16200 16200 10800 10800
Sessions All All Order Order
Pseudo R2 .36461729 .34698616 .36145939 .34504641
LR Chi-squared 7078.48 6689.58 4648.74 4476.73
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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